It’s a ‘summer of exercises’ for the Foreign Malign Influence Center
Past gray halls, TVs playing Fox and CNN, a wall on the “Evolution of Espionage,” and a cigar bomb in a case… officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence gave a few of us journalists a first-ever briefing on a little known entity called the Foreign Malign Influence Center. The center is leading the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and assess overseas influence operations ahead of the election in November, which is all but guaranteed to be tense -- especially in the immediate days after votes are cast, election experts tells me.
As I sat there, I thought about how influence has evolved in the last two presidential elections. Both saw an onslaught of deliberately distorted information which found its way to impassioned consumers on social media. Both had to contend with intentions to undermine trust in the integrity of the elections.
But in 2016, the disinformation emanated from Russia, aided by cyberattacks that led the U.S. to designate elections as critical infrastructure. No one really talks about that particular day anymore. But Homeland Security’s designation came on Jan. 6, 2017, exactly four years before an angry mob of Americans, fueled by domestic falsities, stormed the U.S. Capitol to stop the peaceful transition of power. The disinformation from within included persistently unproven accusations of rigged voting machines and widespread voter fraud. Perceived injustice incited the Capitol attack, fomented battles with social media companies, and undoubtedly birthed new conspiracy theories and anti-government extremists. This time, Moscow simply had to augment the narrative. A declassified Intelligence Community Assessment from 2021 stated that Russia “generally promoted former President Trump and his commentary, including repeating his political messaging on the election results.”
At the intelligence briefing, I wondered if this election year would deepen the connection between the foreign and domestic, amplified by more foes getting into the disinformation business and by the infinitely prolific energy of generative AI. Even down ballot races are of interest this time around, said the officials. And it is clear that the domestic component remains the most complicated piece for the U.S., as it runs the risk of stepping on privacy and free speech, or at least prompting that fear in some Americans.
A reporter asked about how the center will determine if a piece of content is foreign or domestic. An official sighed and said, “Where to begin?” There are an increasing number of actors that now make the task harder, from proxies to commercial firms that may or may not be complicit in a malign influence operations, she said. Forensic analysis can also be used to determine whether the media is authentic or synthetic. The content must be nominated by the intelligence community, she added. That means the U.S. has a head start on assessing origin.
Part of the center’s work involves providing notifications to the public and, privately, to targets. The officials wouldn’t say how many nonpublic notifications they have issued this year. But when it comes to public notifications, a group of officials will make a recommendation, then a more senior group within the agencies and led by the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines will make the final call. The entire process generally takes a week, but can be sped up to 24 hours, an official said.
Timing could be crucial in the days leading up to the election. But an election security expert who didn’t want to be named told me he was concerned that the U.S. government may hold back from making these public disclosures, fearing it could be accused of partisanship. And around the table of journalists and officials, I described how the State Department’s Global Engagement Center exclusively counters foreign disinformation, yet still is seen by some Republicans as suppressing conservative voices in the U.S. through the projects it has supported. As a result, the majority-Republican House has denied multiple bids to reauthorize funding for the center this year.
Brows furrowed, as one official told me there is balance in their interagency processes, that they are “insulated” from the political, and that they have the “right” number of voices. “It’s humans that have the discussions,” she said, implying the humans would rise above the political fray. It’s “apolitical, nonpartisan procedures,” said the other official.
So far, when it comes to foreign disinformation, it looks like the deck is stacked against President Joe Biden: Officials have already seen Russia undermining Biden with fake videos. The findings of disinformation experts suggest that China has calculated that boosting former President Donald Trump is better for Beijing.
And if there is no parity of foreign influence, would certain members of Congress accuse the government of attempting to influence voters? I was told that the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines won’t let that stop her from notifying the public of genuine threats, that she is “very forward leaning.”
The officials gave a brief breakdown by countries of interest:
Russia: The officials consider Russia the primary threat, which is no surprise given Moscow’s track record in recent U.S. elections. (The Soviets even invented the word disinformation about a century ago. This year, the intelligence community’s Annual Threat Assessment found that “Russia is contemplating how U.S. electoral outcomes in 2024 could impact Western support to Ukraine and probably will attempt to affect the elections in ways that best support its interests and goals. Russia’s influence actors have adapted their efforts to better hide their hand, and may use new technologies, such as generative AI.”)
China: So far, officials say they have not seen Chinese interference with election infrastructure and that Beijing is cautious, recognizing the potential blowback. (In April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN that the U.S. has seen China attempting to “influence and arguably interfere” with the election. Numerous reports by researchers show how China has built authentic social media accounts that favor Trump. For example, three notable accounts posted caustic remarks on “antisemitism, sex education, drag queens, drugs and gun crime. The content generally comes from a perspective of intending to chime with mainstream right-wing audiences except on the issue of Israel and the conflict in Gaza.” The accounts have also shared AI-generated content.)
Iran: The center is paying attention to Iran’s potential role as a “chaos agent” to promote violence. Indeed, the only election-related notification that ever went public came during the 2020 election season, officials said. The federal government warned that Iranians had spoofed the far right Proud Boys in emails as a way to intimidate voters in Alaska, Arizona, and Florida.
Cuba: Officials anticipate they will see activity from the Cubans before the election. (And it’s worth considering their ties to Russian and Chinese intelligence.)
U.S. Allies: Officials say they are tracking a range of actors, which also “naturally” means some allies who see the election as critical to their national interest. They did not identify specific countries.
I asked the officials about the results of the private briefings they have given to targets this year. Did those foreign influence operations stop? Did their targets get smarter? I was essentially told that follow-ups to address these questions are not a part of their process. But new information regarding the operations could end up back in their framework, the officials said. Essentially, the intelligence community may continue to monitor the influence operations.
The briefing came just before Reuters published a bombshell investigation that revealed a Pentagon influence campaign against China during the height of the pandemic. Death rates, and global competition for covid vaccine development and distribution (a la vaccine diplomacy), were soaring. Bypassing objections from the State Department, U.S. military personnel and contractors reportedly created hundreds of fake social media accounts in 2020 to undermine China’s Sinovac vaccine in the Philippines, which had been available long before its American counterparts. (“We didn’t do a good job sharing vaccines with partners. So what was left to us was to throw shade on China’s,” a senior military officer involved in the effort told Reuters.) Officials terminated the program in 2021.
For now, the Foreign Malign Influence Center, which started in 2022 with Congressional authorization, finds itself in a “summer of exercises,” as one official described it. Staff are working with the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security on their notification framework. They’re addressing the authentication of deepfakes. And they’re weighing the possibility of working with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency on exercises to protect election infrastructure, such as voting machines and software.
A summer of exercises… seasons of preparation at seemingly unprecedented levels. Yet I remember the days before U.S. presidential elections felt so daunting -- when you didn’t have to worry about being followed or filmed; you weren’t concerned for the safety of fellow voters or election workers, or doubtful that your vote would be counted; the flood of lies came mostly in cheesy campaign ads, since social media did not exist then to be its platform. Does that time belong with the dinosaurs?
After the U.S. election, the intelligence community has 45 days to put together an assessment. It must be declassified before its revelations reach everyday Americans.