Shay Hershkovitz, a former officer from Israel’s military intelligence service Aman, spoke with me today. Now a professor at Georgetown and an adjunct senior analyst at Rand, he described how Israel’s intel services have supported militias in hostile areas— most recently in Gaza, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to keep Hamas at bay.
I started by asking him about whether Mossad or the Israel Defense Forces would back armed groups in Iran, once the war is over and the dust settles. “I sure hope not,” he said bluntly. “Nobody knows what’s going to happen. This is essentially playing with fire.”
Mossad and other units used local support during the Twelve-Day War, he told me. “But there’s a difference between tactical support, ‘Point me to this house or point me to this facility,’ and long-term strategic cooperation or collaboration.”
And Israel’s previous attempts to weaponize local militias — like in South Lebanon in the 1980s — have backfired.
In Gaza, Shin Bet has been working with so-called pop-up militias in an attempt to create a bottom-up governing alternative to Hamas. These militants are not vetted, he said, and many are radical Islamists or criminals.
“Individuals with histories of smuggling and drug trafficking. Some people had personal vendettas against Hamas. And some people, either religiously or ideologically or both, resist Hamas. And this is a problem, because they resist Hamas, not from a liberal point of view, but from a Salafi jihadist point of view.”
He described an intel service driven by a solitary aim. “For Shin Bet, as long as they can achieve their goal, they can work with whomever.”
I asked him what was in it for the Palestinians, who might have lost their homes and loved ones. “These groups are not Zionists,” Shay told me. They are paid monthly salaries (about 3,000 shekels or $1,000), receive medical support at Israeli hospitals if they’re wounded, and are handed assault rifles — such as seized Kalashnikovs and sidearms.
In return, they have cleared out Hamas’ tunnels, gathered intelligence and scanned buildings before the IDF entered, and acted as a security force for aid distribution. When they attack Hamas, there is often drone-cover, real-time intel-sharing, and even airstrikes to protect units, Shay said.
And the groups are just as single-minded as Shin Bet: “They would collaborate with Israel or whoever to fulfill their local agendas, their local objectives to get some money, to get control, to get power, and also to be considered — if and when the day after comes — to be considered as a legitimate political force.”
Shay described internal rivalries between four major militias or clans who differ in ideology, location, and approaches:
The Popular Forces based in Rafah, led by the late Yasser Abu Shabab (Tarabin clan) and now Ghassan al-Dahini.
The Fatah-affiliated Gaza City Militia led by Rami Khiles.
Khan Yunis Militia, led by Hussam al-Astal and Yasser Khanidek.
Northern Forces, led by Ashraf al-Mansi and operating in Beit Lahia, a city in the Gaza Strip, north of Jabalia.
Ultimately, Shay says, these groups are not united or empowered to become legitimate political players. And they do not offer a real chance to stand up to Hamas.
Much more in the video. And the second portion, on tactics, training, and lessons from the past, comes out on Tuesday.
